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Introduction 
Unfamiliar face recognition, the visual identification of a person with whom you are 
unfamiliar, is commonly utilized in security settings. However, our continued reliance on 
unfamiliar face recognition for identity verification is not supported by findings from 
psychological science [1]. Research has shown that whether it be for face photos or live 
faces, specialists or student control groups, unfamiliar face recognition is prone to error and 
can be exploited by fraudsters seeking to deceive identity checkers. The selection of ³super-
recognizHUV´(SRs), or professionals trained in unfamiliar face recognition, for security-
critical roles would appear to be the best strategy we have at present to improve accuracy in 
unfamiliar face identification. However, the selection and deployment of these individuals 
must be standardized, with clear criteria for SR categorization, and individual SRs must be 
assessed across a variety of tests (i.e., matching and memory) to ensure effective deployment. 
We will review the state of the art in unfamiliar face recognition research, before discussing 
two newer forms of identity fraud: hyper-realistic masks and morphs. Advancements in 
surveillance and biometric technologies will not obviate the need for border and law 
enforcement agencies to have capabilities in human-based facial recognition. 
 
Unfamiliar Face Recognition in Security Contexts 
Border FRQWURORIILFLDOVDUHUHTXLUHGWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUDWUDYHOHU¶VSDVVSRUWSKRWRPDWFKHV
their face. The wrong decision in that context could result in an identity fraudster entering the 
country. Although psychological research has already established that matching unfamiliar 
faces is prone to error and can be exploited by fraudsters wishing to deceive ID checkers, we 
continue to rely heavily on unfamiliar face recognition for identity verification in our national 
security framework [2-4].  
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The Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT) [5] is a well-established test of unfamiliar face 
recognition, which mirrors the photo-to-face matching task performed by border officials. 
Participants are simply asked to decide whether pairs of high quality face photos show the 
same person or two different people (see Figure 1). Accuracy on this task is poor: error rates 
of between 15 and 20 percent are the norm, rising to 30 percent when the faces are still 
photographs taken from poor quality closed-circuit television (CCTV) [6]. In addition, 
unfamiliar face matching error rates have been shown to reach 40 percent when the faces are 
of a different ethnic background to the viewer (UK/Egyptian faces arrays) [7]. It is important 
to note that the level of face matching error reported in lab settings using face photos are 











Figure 1 An example of two trials from the Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT). The top 
pair shows two instances of the same person (match trial), while the bottom pair shows two 
different people (mismatch trial) [5]. 
 
The aforementioned studies were conducted with non-specialist viewers selected from 
samples of university students at the investigating institution, and therefore it is important to 
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determine whether people who carry out these tasks professionally are able to perform more 
accurately than untrained viewers. Researchers investigated whether the inclusion of a face 
photo on credit cards would reduce identity fraud [10]. The study found that motivated 
supermarket cashiers who frequently check photo-ID cards accepted fraudulent photo credit 
cards (i.e., the photo did not depict the bearer) as genuine on more than 50 percent of trials. 
For police officers with experience in forensic identification, error rates were found to be no 
better than student controls in a task that required matching unfamiliar face photos to CCTV 
image stills [11]²a core task in effective policing. In addition, a major international study of 
face recognition performance in Australian passport officials recently reported that this group 
incorrectly accepted a fake passport photo as genuine on 14 percent of trials, with 
performance on the GFMT being no different to student controls [12]. These findings suggest 
that training and professional experience do not lead to improved face recognition 
performance by specialists.  
 
Super-Recognizers 
As previously outlined, research shows that trained and highly motivated face recognizers in 
law enforcement, border control, and the retail industry do not show an advantage in 
unfamiliar face matching performance relative to controls. However, tests of unfamiliar face 
recognition consistently show a large range of individual differences in performance. 
Therefore, selecting SRs could hold the key to improved matching accuracy [13].  
 
Support for the use of SRs in security contexts has been provided by a small but growing 
field of literature on the SR advantage. The London Metropolitan Police (a large, elite force) 
utilize officers who have been tested and categorized as SRs to assist with the identification 
of suspects from photographs or still images captured from CCTV video. A recent review 
[14] stated that individuals categorized as SRs score exceptionally well on standard tests of 
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face recognition (such as the Cambridge Face Memory Test [CFMT] [15]) and tests that 
require both recognition memory for faces and simultaneous face matching [16]. SRs are also 
adept at recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces [17,18], and eye-tracking data suggests 
there may be qualitative differences in the way in which SRs process faces [19]. 
 
Research on super-recognition is still in its infancy, and while the London Metropolitan 
Police SR unit has received positive feedback from within the force, researchers outline a 
number of insightful caveats in relation to the research findings, as well as a series of 
important recommendations [14]. The authors note that when group level analyses are 
performed (SRs vs controls), the SRs, as a group, outperform controls. However, further 
analysis of individual SR scores reveal that not all are performing above average on these 
tests, and in some cases SRs can perform exceptionally well of tests of face memory (useful 
in identifying repeat offenders in policing), but poorly on tests of face matching (useful at 
detecting that a passport photo does not match a travelers face at border control) [16]. In that 
cDVHLIZHDUHWRVHOHFW65¶s on the basis of face memory test (i.e., the CFMT), we cannot 
take it for granted that deploying them at border control, where matching faces to passport 
photos is key, would provide an effective anti-fraud counter-measure. To further establish the 
utility of SR in face recognition contexts, the authors¶ recommendations include: the 
development of standardized tests for super-recognition, and clear criteria for the 
categorization of such individuals in task related contexts (memory/matching); and the 
combination of our best human SR with our best recognition algorithms in order to assess if 
performance can reach a level of perfection RUZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDQDFFXUDF\µFHLOLQJ¶IRU
unfamiliar face recognition [14]. 
 
Sophisticated Fraud (Hyper-Realistic Silicone Masks)  
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The super-recognizer advantage has, so far, been shown to be effective for cases of 
³opportunistic face identity fraud´ in which a fraudster has been able to obtain a passport in 
which the image of the victim looks somewhat like them. London Metropolitan 3ROLFH65¶V
were found to outperform normed average scores on the mismatch sub-test on the GFMT 
[20], which is analogous to this type of fraud. However, it is not clear whether SRs would 
display an advantage in the detection of ³deliberate disguise,´ in which a fraudster has altered 
their appearance (i.e., through glasses, wigs, beards, etc.) to look more like the face photo in 
the stolen passport. Nonetheless, deliberate disguise does provide a route to identity fraud.  
 
In 1994, researchers assessed the effects of disguise in the form of the addition of sunglasses 
and beards [21]. Participants learned a series of faces which included these disguises, and it 
was found that when these disguises were removed recognition of the face was reduced by 30 
percent for beards and 40 percent for sunglasses. Similarly, more recent research showed that 
participants accepted two different, but disguised faces, as the same person 19 percent of the 
time for subjects from the same ethic background, and 24 percent of the time for subjects 
from a different ethnic background [22]. While these single item physical disguises provide a 
route to identity fraud, it has now become apparent that individuals seeking to disguise their 
identity are turning to hyper-realistic, over-head silicone face masks.  
 
These silicone masks (which also cover the neck and nipple region, so that clothing can 
obscure the edges of the silicone) are produced by a small number of companies and are used 
primarily in the entertainment industry. However, in a recent spate of bank robberies in the 
U.S., a white offender was found to have used one of these masks to disguise himself as an 
African American [23]. Six out of the seven bank tellers who witnessed the robberies 
wrongly identified a black man as the culprit in a photo line-up (i.e., they accepted the mask 
as a genuine face). The situation was only resolved when the girlfriend of the actual offender 
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notified the police, at which point, the African American suspect was released from jail. [23] 
In another remarkable example, a young Asian man had obtained the passport of an elderly 
white Caucasian male [24]. Using a hyper-realistic mask, the individual was able to pass 
several identity checks at a Hong Kong airport. The use of the mask was only discovered 
when the perpetrator decided to remove it mid-flight [24]. Such reports represent a 
concerning new route to identity fraud, in which an individual can completely change their 
facial appearance to try and match a stolen passport photo or other identity document.  
 
Despite the potential benefit to fraudsters that these masks could provide, a recent study 
provides the only attempt to date to assess and quantify our ability to detect the presence 
of/be fooled by these masks [25]. In the study, a white Caucasian man wore a hyper-realistic 
white Caucasian mask, as seen in Figure 2, and appeared to read a book while sitting on a 
bench in the middle of a university campus [25]. Passers-by were stopped and asked to rate 
the individual on task-irrelevant dimensions, such as attractiveness, from a distance of 5m 
(near) or 10m (far). Upon completing the rating, participants were then asked a spontaneous, 
prompted, or explicit mask-detection question. The study found that none of the participants 
in the far condition, and only six percent in the near condition reported the presence of a 
mask at spontaneous or prompted report. For the explicit report question²³Was that person 
wearing a hyper-realistic mask"´²57 percent of participants failed to detect that the man was 
wearing a mask. Detection rates were significantly higher for those viewing from 2m than 
10m. This study shows that in a naturalistic context with relatively close viewing distances, 











Figure 2 An illustration of the live mask detection experiment set in the middle of a 
university campus. The images show the participant wearing the hyper-realistic mask (left) 
and the participant without the mask (right). (Released) [25] 
 
Sophisticated Fraud (Face Morphing)  
Internet and smartphone users now have access to a variety of face image manipulation apps 
that support the digital ³morphing´ of the face photos of two different people, with such 
images retaining facial information that is specific to both identities (see Figure 3 for 
examples). Identity fraudsters can utilize this digital tool in two ways. First, if they have a 
willing participant, a passport morph could fool a passport renewal official (as it looks 
somewhat like the participant¶VILOHSKRWRLQWRLVVXLQJDfraudulently obtained genuine 
(FOG) passport, which both individuals can use [26-28]. Secondly, even without access to a 
participant, fraudsters can use stolen identity information to complete the same process to 
obtain a FOG passport for their own use.  
 
Recent work showed that the acceptance rates for passport morphs as a match to a genuine 
target image was significantly greater than that for a similar looking foil, when human 
recognizers were unaware that there were morphs in the set [29]. While acceptance rates for 
50/50 morphs (which are likely to confer the greatest deception in this context) were 
significantly reduced when participants were made aware of this type of fraud and were asked 
to actively detect such images, the acceptance rate still remained higher than that for a 
different, but similar looking, individual. Although, as noted above, there has not yet been 
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any direct assessment of 65V¶ ability to detect physical disguise, the authors of this study 
reported that morph detection accuracy correlated with accuracy on the mismatch sub-test 
(but not the match sub-test or overall accuracy) on the GFMT. This suggests a potential link 
between established super-recognition skills and the ability to detect passport morphs, and 







Figure 3 Examples of the morphed passport photos [29]  
 
Conclusion 
While the selection and recruitment of SRs is a welcome advance in improving the accuracy 
of unfamiliar face identification, the standardization of testing, selection criteria, and 
effective deployment are key considerations. Further research is required to ensure the 
development of effective counter-measures. The Department of Defense could benefit from 
this research by implementing SRs in border protection, airports, and other contexts where 
security is of paramount concern. Additionally, face recognition could be used for 
identification of individuals in surveillance missions as well as body identification. The 
intelligence community at-large may also be interested in deploying the hyper-realistic masks 
for operational purposes. 
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